Computer Viruses by Miller, Roger L.
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC




Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Roger L., "Computer Viruses" (1989). Honors Theses. Paper 308.
Computer Viruses 
by 
Roger L. Miller 
Senior Honors Project 
CS 492 
Dr. Nicholas Phillips 
May 5, 1989 
Preface 
Before I present this copy of my project, I would like to 
take a moment to talk about how the nature of the project changed 
from its inception to its completion. Originally I had planned 
to disassemble the Pakistani Virus and write a program to attack 
it. A bold venture to be sure but one I thought was within 
reach. At the urging of my advisor, Dr. Phillips, I altered the 
description to make it at least partially a survey of computer 
viruses, as reported in the media and other sources. I also 
decided to add the part about a small case study of the attack at 
SIU. 
As it turns out, experience again saved the day. I ran into 
numerous difficulties trying to take apart the virus, much less 
writing a program to counter it. With the lack of time and 
resources, degree of difficulty the Pakistani virus is reputed 
to be the most technically sophisticated virus in the world), and 
the normal rigors of a college semester, the task proved too 
much. So I fell back onto the survey part of my project. 
There were also problems in this. The resources that were 
available to me were rather limited. I had trouble obtaining the 
more comprehensive and technical reports concerning viruses, even 
through the inter-library loan system. I decided near the 
project's completion to keep the non-technical because of 
difficulty in obtaining resources, the technical aspects are very 
case-specific, and the readibility for non computer scientists 
would have been significantly decreased. 
Compute~ Vi~uses 
In a 1959 pape~, compute~ pionee~ John von Neumann suggested 
that compute~ p~og~ams might actually mUltiply, taking on a life 
all thei~ own. ' As so often happens, what once appea~ed fanciful 
science fiction has become a ha~sh ~eality. P~og~ams c~eating 
othe~ p~og~ams is an a~ea of intense ~esea~ch and it has been 
successfully implemented in a limited scope. P~og~ams that do 
seemingly have a pe~ve~se life of thei~ own have stepped into the 
limelight in the past yea~. National attention was focused on so 
called vi~uses when ARPAnet, a milita~y and ~esea~ch 
communications netwo~k, was ove~whelmed by a vi~al attack in 
Novembe~ 1988. In this pape~, I plan to discuss vi~uses and 
~elated p~oblems, take a look at one vi~us attack in pa~ticula~, 
and examine what the futu~e holds fo~ compute~ secu~ity. 
A~ound 1969, th~ee p~og~amme~s at AT&T's Bell Labo~ato~ies, 
pe~haps acting on von Neumann's theo~ies, took them one step 
fa~the~ and implemented self-~eplicating code, that is code that 
will make a duplicate of itself. Fu~the~, using the fact that a 
byte is a byte, they ~ealized that systems using the same p~ima~y 
o~ co~e memo~y fo~ p~og~am and data sto~age, left p~og~ams 
vulne~able to being consumed (as datal by othe~ p~og~ams, o~ even 
by themselves. With all of this in mind, they designed a "game" 
that would pit two self-~eplicating p~og~ams against each othe~ 
like gladiato~s, with co~e memo~y being thei~ a~ena. These 
p~og~ams would then "battle to the death" by duplicating 
themselves and erasing or consuming the opposing program. The 
winner was the program that had destroyed the other program or 
controlled the most memory at the end of the allotted time. Soon 
the game caught on at other research facilities and was dubbed 
lICore Wars".2 
Its creators realized the damage that could be done by their 
"organisms" if they were allowed to run rampant. The actual code 
wasn't as troublesome as the theory. There was the fear that 
someone with malicious intent could loose a program and cause 
untold destruction of data. In reality the threat was small 
because a machine with code gone wild could easily shut down. At 
the time most machines stood alone but as connectivity and 
computer access grew, so did the danger. For the most part, Core 
Wars and the idea of battling destructive code was kept quiet • 
• until 1983. 
At an Association for Computing Machinery banquet, Ken 
Thompson, creator of the original version of UNIX, was being 
given an award. In his speech, he told of core wars and how to 
create organisms. "If you have never done this, I urge you. to 
try it on your own. "'" In 1984, "Scientific American" followed 
with an article on Core Wars and offered guidelines for creating 
your own battlefields and organisms. Fred Cohen presented a 
paper, Viruses: Theory and Experiments, to a computer security 
conference in 1984.- Soon after the name, computer virus, caught 
on and so did the practice of creating and releasing them. 
Occasionally stories of viral epidemics appeared in the press 
but for the most part the public was unaware of what could 
happen. In 1986 sporadic stories about viruses and their 
potential danger were printed but they were ignored or dismissed 
even by many professional in the field. On Wednesday, November 
2, 1988 the outbreak that many had feared and some even predicted 
occurred. 
At about 6pm Wednesday the infectious code (technically it 
was a worm) was first noticed at several computer centers 
connected by Internet and began attracting a great deal of 
attention a few hours later.~ The worm was reproducing so 
rapidly, it slowed down what ever system it infected. Because of 
its crippling effects and sophistication many talented computer 
scientists were worried but intrigued by the worm. People all 
along Internet, which is connected to several premiere research 
networks such as BAR and ARPAnet, began to dissect the worm and 
work on a fix.· Graduate students, researchers and system 
operators along the network battled around the clock; by Friday 
night, the worm was under control and had nearly been eliminated, 
barely two days after it had been unleashed. It had no lasting 
effects except to raise a flag of warning about what could have 
happened had the worm not been benign. If not for a flaw in the 
code, the worm would replicated at a significantly slower rate 
and probably could have gone unnoticed for months. It's ironic 
that the creator, Robert T. Morris Jr., made his mistake when 
adding code to increase his worm's longevity in the network and 
avoid defenses aimed at it. 7 What is even more ironic is that 
Robert T. Morris Sr. was one of the programmers who came up with 
the concept of Core Wars. S 
The programs written and used for core wars are a far cry 
from the code that allowed the worm to infect and estimated 6000 
computers world wide. The worm was designed to exploit flaws in 
a UNIX operating system, and then only in certain types of 
machines.· This in turn differs from the dozens of viruses that 
have plagued personal computer users everywhere. When the media 
started to report stories of computer epidemics, everything was 
glazed with the generalized name virus. Actually there are 
several different classifications of replicant code. As with 
most topics in computer science, there aren't any sharp lines 
drawn to distinguish types but several generally accepted 
guidelines are used below. One thing that can be generalized is 
that they are all computer programs, usually written with 
mischievous or malicious intent. During some of the initial 
media reports, people were fearful that they could catch and get 
sick from computer viruses. This is, of course, totally 
ridiculous because the viruses are only programs and not 
biological organisms. 
A real virus, which is a living organism, attaches itself to 
a cell and forces it to duplicate itself over and over again. A 
computer virus is so named because it behaves in much the same 
manner, embedding itself in another program or file. Once a virus 
comes in contact with a system, it typically attacks by altering 
the operating system, the master program that drives a computer. 
The corrupted operating system places copies of the virus into 
other programs that it comes into contact with. If this other 
software is run again, it will have the same ability to corrupt 
the operating system and infect other software. When possible the 
virus also corrupts the master copy of the operating systems so 
that the computer system will be infected as soon as it is 
started up. 
One common strategy used to spread a virus is to hide the 
code within another program. This is known as the Trojan Horse 
method. Naturally, users won't operate on a syste~ they know is 
infected. Therefore to get the bug into other systems, they 
place the virus inside a very attractive package, say a word 
processor or a game. The new user doesn't think anything of 
using the new program and soon the virus has spread throughout 
his entire library of software. Several hackers were especially 
devious in their choice of a trojan horse program. A program 
called flushot3 was designed to fight/detect viruses. Rather 
then being commercially available, it used the concept of 
shareware distribution and was readily available on many bulletin 
boards. The problem was that vandals modified copies of flushot3 
and inserted viruses in them.'o Then instead of protecting 
their systems, people were actually infecting them. 
A worm, like the one that attacked Internet, differs from a 
virus because it is a self contained program. This means that it 
doesn't attach itself to other software. Once in a system, it 
remains a separate entity and survives by living off of flaws in 
the host system's logic. In the Internet infection, several 
computer labs remained uneffected because they were using 
modified versions of UNIX." These nonstandard versions had 
eliminated the well known weaknesses of UNIX, weaknesses that 
have been recognized for years but often ignored. 
A bacterium is a program that is identified more by its 
results than its methods. It keeps duplicating itself, usually 
by exploiting a weakness in the host system. Eventually the 
system is slowed down to a snails pace just by the sheer 
magnitude of jobs created by the bacterium. It doesn't actually 
alter or damage anything but the system is rendered ineffective 
because most of the processor time is used to create and send out 
clones of the program. A case of this occurred around Christmas 
1987. Somehow a "Christmas Card" got into the BITnet network. 
Aside from the seasons greeting, it drew a ~icture of a christmas 
tree on the screen. At the same time, it sent a copy of itself 
to everyone on the current users mailing list. It propagated 
very rapidly and bogged down the network. 12 It was necessary to 
shut down the network to clear the forest. 
Both worms and viruses potentially pose different problems 
than bacterium because they may include routines that perform 
special functions, rather than just survival. Their purpose may 
be something as playful and harmless as to display a message 
asking for cookies; its purpose may be something as potentially 
harmful as wiping out a data base. Often this hidden routine is 
constructed so that it executes at a predetermined date, after a 
given number or repetitions, or whenever some other specified 
conditions are meet. This "time bomb" effect is what makes 
infections particularly worrisome. 
A classic time bomb was inco~po~ated by a p~og~am dubbed the 
PLO vi~us. It tu~ned up at the Heb~ew Unive~sity and othe~ sites 
th~oughout Is~ael. It included a couple of time linked 
functions. On the thi~teenth of eve~y month, it would ~ep~oduce 
madly. Its p~ima~y and most dest~uctive function was set fo~ 
F~iday, May thi~teenth, 1988. On this date it would e~ase all 
info~mation sto~ed in memo~y and on all accessible disks. This 
vi~us ~epo~tedly sp~ead to compute~s used by the Is~eali Defense 
Fo~ce and at the minist~y of educations' educational cente~, it 
dest~oyed fifteen thousand dolla~s wo~th of softwa~e and ove~ 
seven thousand man hou~s of ~esea~ch.'~ 
Anothe~ p~olific vi~us that uses a time bomb, though not with 
that ~egula~ity, was the Ie) BRAIN vi~us, also known as the 
Pakistani vi~us. This vi~us was developed by two b~othe~s who 
we~e self taught p~og~amme~s. They ~an a compute~ sto~e in 
Laho~e, Pakistan. O~iginally they inse~ted the vi~us only in 
softwa~e of thei~ own c~eation. If anyone attempted to illegally 
copy thei~ p~og~ams, the bootlegged ve~sion would eventually 
malfunction. The pi~ate would then be fo~ced to come to them to 
get it fixed, if at all. Soon the Alvi b~othe~ began ~unning 
thei~ own pi~ating ope~ation, though they claimed it was legal 
due to a loophole in Pakistani law. They sold ve~sions of 
popula~ p~og~ams such as Lotus 1-2-3 and Wo~dsta~ at cut-~ate 
p~ices. But they included the vi~us in ve~sions sold to 
fo~eigne~s, pa~ticula~ly Ame~icans. They ~easoned that copy 
~ights didn't include softwa~e unde~ Pakistan's laws, the~efo~e 
local people who bought the softwa~e we~en't b~eaking the law. 
Fo~eigne~s, howeve~, we~e pi~ates and dese~ved to be punished and 
got contaminated ve~sions. 14 
The Pakistani vi~us and alte~ed ve~sions of it have been 
found all ove~ the wo~ld. It gained a lot of attention when a 
~epo~te~ fo~ the P~ovidence Jou~nal-Bulletin discove~ed that he~ 
disks had been infected by the vi~us. F~oma Joselow, a financial 
~epo~te~, was p~epa~ing to w~ite a sto~y and t~ied to access he~ 
disk that contained six months of notes and inte~views; when she 
kept getting disk e~~o~s, she took the disk to the newspape~'s 
compute~ cente~. The systems analyst found a message hidden in 
the jumble of data: "WELCOME TO THE DUNGEON CONTACT US FOR 
VACCINATION." It also had the add~ess and phone numbe~ of the 
Alvi b~othe~s' compute~ sto~e in Pakistan.1~ 
The message is the same one that has g~eeted thousands of 
unive~sity students ac~oss the count~y. Because students we~e 
the most f~equent custome~s at B~ain Compute~ Se~vices, the~e is 
a highe~ concent~ation of compute~ usage on campuses, and not 
much conside~ation given to bo~~owing and copying softwa~e in the 
student envi~onment, unive~sities have been the sites of several 
epidemics of the B~ain vi~us. The University of Miami at Ohio 
state was the site of one such outb~eak. Anothe~ campus that was 
st~uck by the vi~us was Southe~n Illinois Unive~sity at 
Ca~bondale. 
In the middle of the fall 1988 semeste~, students began 
having p~oblems with thei~ softwa~e. The~e we~e nume~ous 
complaints of data being lost, especially f~om business students 
and othe~s in the college of business. In the main compute~ lab 
in Faner Hall, students are able to check out software from a 
library which includes Lotus 1-2-3, Wordstar and many other 
programs. Many of the students affected were working on a Lotus 
1-2-3 project. It was estimated that two hundred students in 
that class alone had their software exposed to the Pakistani 
virus. Evidently someone had a bootlegged version of Lotus or 
some other program and used it or an infected data disk while 
using software checked out from Faner Lab. In this way, someone 
managed to infect the library's software. Then another student 
checked it out and caught the virus; the cycle just went on and 
on from there. 
Bill Baron, lab director for Computing Affairs at SIU, said 
that he had heard talk of viral epidemics but had no reason to 
expect one at SIU. He also said its severity was partly 
Computing Affairs fault. "Our disks weren't write protected (in 
the software library). We were being overly benevolent. Many 
people who come in and use programs like PC Write don't even have 
a working disk. So they put their working file on our the disk 
so they can print their paper." He added that not having the 
write protect tabs ( which would prevent the virus from altering 
the disk) also made it easier when lab workers went to 
reconfigure the disks. The epidemic was severe enough that 
computing affairs shut down the software library. 
The library was shut down for three days, in which they 
implemented a three part plan to clean up the Pakistani virus at 
SIU. They consider there to be three types of software: 
computing affairs, faculty for instruction, and user(student). 
It was decid~d to clean up computing affairs first, since they 
provide the majority of software on campus. They had to 
completely rebuild their libraries from the manufacturers 
originals. Normally copies are made from masters, copies of the 
originals that are configured for SIU's particular terminals, but 
even the masters had been corrupted. 
The second phase was to verify the integrity of instructor 
supplied software - special software that professor leave to be 
checked out by students. They notified all faculty that their 
software was quarantined until they came and personally verified 
that it was free of infection and signed a letter to that effect. 
Phase three was to clear up, as much as possible, user 
software - that is software that students carry around. To 
achieve this goal, a check station was set up in Faner lab. At 
the station, lab workers would check anyone's software for 
viruses and if requested, to eliminate it. Mr. Baron said they 
assumed most computer science majors and other with computer 
knowledge would have already taken care of their software; the 
station, which was operated for two weeks, was for everyone 
else. The service was provided free to students but not to 
computing affairs. It cost about six-hundred additional dollars 
in salaries to man the station. 
Measures have been taken to insure that this won't happen 
again. All of computing affairs disk are specially write 
protected. Rather than the normal tabs that can be peeled on and 
of, special labels were attached. If anyone removes the tab, it 
will probably rip, or at least be noticed. lab assistants set 
aside any softwa~e that appea~s to have been tampered with, to be 
examined late~. Also a policy has been instituted that anyone 
who ~emoves a w~ite-p~otect tab will tempo~a~ily lose lab 
p~ivileges. While M~. Ba~on has faith in these measu~es, he 
knows that SIU isn't immune. Cu~~ently a vi~us that infects 
Macintoshes is plaguing computing affai~s. This is a vi~us that, 
beca~se the system it attacks is ve~y unusual, will take quite 
some time to eliminate. 
In the case of the vi~al attack at SIU-C, the ~eal ~isk of 
doing any widesp~ead damage was limited because the vi~us 
attacked pe~sonal compute~s. A pe~son's dange~ was limited to 
how much he used someone else's softwa~e and how ca~eful he was 
about backing up his own. With a few simple, common sense 
p~ecautions, the chance of infection was slim. To fu~the~ insu~e 
the integ~ity of you~ pe~sonal computer, there a~e many p~og~ams 
available that can aid in counte~ing vi~uses. As always, when 
the~e is a demand fo~ a p~oduct, business wo~ld is ~eady to 
~espond. Afte~ vi~uses gained wide noto~iety in the fallon 
1988, the softwa~e indust~y came to the ~escue. Within the span 
of seve~al months whe~e,the~e had been a void, the~e we~e 
suddenly dozens of p~og~ams ~eady to end you~ vi~us woes. 
With such ~eassu~ing names as Disk Watche~ and Gua~d Dog, 
people we~e su~e that thei~ vi~us wo~~ies we~e ove~; but in a 
~ecent test conducted by PC Magazine found that no softwa~e was 
completely successful against vi~uses. They t~ied out eleven of 
the most popula~ anti-vi~al p~oducts. As a test, th~ee vi~uses 
that attack in diffe~ent ways we~e used against the packages; no 
program detected all three but a couple did do very well."· 
Nothing, aside from living in a glass house and writing all of 
your own software can absolutely guarantee your computer's 
security. The problem with developing technical solutions 
against viruses is that the people who create viruses are just as 
ingenious as those who defend against them. It can be seen as a 
tit-for-tat war; someone writes a virus - someone else develops 
a defense; another figures out a way to breach that defense - yet 
another finds a way to improve the defense. The cycle doesn't 
end. 
If technical solutions are temporary fixes at best, what can 
be done to stem the tide of virus attacks? A idea that is more 
applicable at the industrial/commercial level is more emphasis 
on physical security - that is restricting physical aCcess to the 
computer systems and placing tighi checks and usage requirements. 
There are also methods to prevent remote access from unauthorized 
locations. The government's data transmission network is the 
ultimate example of this. They employ private communication 
lines in gas filled tubes; 17 no one could causally reach their 
computers and if they tried to tap the lines, an alarm would be 
sounded. This level of prevention is too costly to be practical 
in most other situations. There are additional problems in 
restricting access and causing legitimate users untold headaches 
just trying to logon. A final consideration is that the viruses 
that have done the most real damage in terms of data lost have 
been loosed by someone on the inside, usually by disgruntled 
former employees. All of the security is for naught if the 
culp~it is/was a legitimate use~. The~e may be ways to limit 
what an employee can do but these are case specific. 
An old tool that is only beginning to be utilized in the 
fight against vi~uses and compute~ c~ime in gene~al is the law. 
People feel that if the~e we~e st~ict punishments associated with 
loosing vi~uses, this would be a sufficient dete~rent. Over the 
past th~ee yea~s, legislato~s have sc~ambled to make laws that 
would deal with the p~oblems. A p~oblem a~ises in that the 
p~oblems a~e coming faste~ than the laws. They'~e playing catch 
up but as fa~ back as 1979, the Ame~ican Ba~ Association has been 
on ~eco~d in favo~ of a unifo~m fede~al compute~ c~ime 
legislation. 'G The~e a~e laws dealing with compute~ c~imes in 
most states and in 1987, Cong~ess passed the Compute~ Secu~ity 
Act '9 and the Fede~al Compute~ C~ime Act in 1988. 20 Mo~e laws 
a~e undoubtedly on the way. So far the~e has been only one test 
case involving a vi~us. In a civil suit in Texas, a p~og~amme~ 
was ~equi~ed to pay $12,000 to his fo~me~ employe~ afte~ 
dest~oying ove~ 100,000 ~eco~ds of sales commissions. The case 
also went to c~iminal cou~t whe~e he could face up to ten yea~s 
in prison. 21 
In many cases finding and p~oving beyond a ~easonable doubt 
that someone c~eated a vi~us will be difficult, to say the least. 
And once again the~e is an additional p~oblem. Companies, 
especially those who handle data sto~age and p~ocessing fo~ 
othe~s, may be ~eluctant to admit that they have been b~eached by 
a vi~us. Having a long public t~ial about the gaps in thei~ 
secu~ity is not in thei~ best interest. Most companies simply 
cover it up deny that there was ever a problem. Even when a 
former employees are the perpetrators, they are sent off with a 
pat on the back rather than a date in court. One company even 
gave a going away party to a former employee to smooth things 
over-. 22 
Even Dr. Harold Highland, the editor-in-chief of Computers 
and Security magazine encouraged cover ups. "My recommendation 
to a corporate entity would be to deny it immediately. I have 
advised industry that if anything like this happens and you can 
kill it by denying it, kill it. """" This is reasonable from one 
perspective - a lot of publicity only puts the spotlight on 
vulnerable companies; There is also the fear of copycat crimes if 
media exposure is too great. It is open to debate though whether 
the fear of punishment after several successful prosecutions 
would offset the chance of copycats. Other companies and the 
public in general could benefit by being made aware of the 
potential dangers that lie in wait for them. 
Where the real and potentially life-threatening danger lies 
is in viral attacks on networks. Untold harm could be done if a 
virus got into a hospital's records or managed to disrupt an air 
traffic control network. The risk grows greater and greater 
every day, as computers become more interconnected and more 
compatible and access easier to gain. Robert Morris Jr.'s virus, 
although its effects were felt worldwide, was only an 
inconvenience. He was playing a game and didn't want to hurt 
anyone; the stakes might be higher in the next game. For the 
most part, luck has kept the computer industry from a major 
disaster. The Internet attack served as a wake up call to 
experts in the field. This time there was no permanent damage. 
Will we be so lucky next time? 
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